Mr. Robert B. Fisher, Jr. (J.D., Tulane University, former U.S. Navy deck officer, partner)
Mr. Thomas Forbes (J.D., Boston University, former U.S. Coast Guard legal officer, partner)
Chaffe McCall LLP

It has been said (in jest) that “a collision at sea can ruin your whole day”. This short paper will attempt to illustrate some navigation basics and is not intended to be a detailed review of the navigation rules. Continuing professional education, company ISM seminars, and training should also play a key role in collision avoidance.

The International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea (The “COLREGS”) are well-known by any competent navigating offi cer, since a thorough knowledge of these is required before receiving any type of Mate’s license.

The Navigation Rules

The Rules are divided into four sections:

1. The “General” rules (Rules 1-3), apply to all vessels at all times, and give the defi nitions of terms used throughout the rules.
2. The “Steering and Sailing Rules” for conduct of vessels in any condition of visibility (Rules 4 through 10).
3. “Conduct of Vessels in Sight of One Another”, includes Rules 11 through 18. In this section are the most basic and commonly-understood “Rules of the Road”, namely, the rules for overtaking (Rule 13), meeting-head-on (Rule 14), and “crossing situations” (Rule 15). Rules 16 and 17 describe the actions to be taken by “give-way” and “stand-on” vessels, while Rule 18 sorts out the priorities of vessel types (e.g. sail, power, fishing, restricted maneuverability, not under command).
4. Finally, Rule 19 describes actions to be taken (or avoided) by vessels in restricted visibility, and the remaining rules (20-37) concern navigation lights, day shapes, and light/whistle signals.

The Root Causes of Collisions

Almost without exception, seagoing mariners know these rules, yet collisions still happen with some regularity. Why? Experience has shown that the greatest number of collisions are caused primarily by two factors:

1. Failure of lookout, wherein vessels fail to see one another, despite the dictates of the “Lookout Rule”; and
2. Failure to understand or appreciate the maneuvers of the other vessel, and failure of both vessels to communicate effectively with each other.

Lookout Rule (Rule 5)

Rule 5 is almost deceptive in its brevity and simplicity:

“Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing as well as all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances or conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.”

How important is a proper lookout? The most-quoted U.S. case is The ARIADNE, by the Supreme Court in 1871 wherein the steamer ARIADNE struck and sank the brig WILLIAM EDWARDS, off New York at night, and, even though EDWARDS’ starboard running light was very dim, ARIADNE was nevertheless partially at fault in failing to see the EDWARDS in time to avoid her. Of this duty the court said:

“The duty of the lookout is of the highest importance. Upon nothing else does the safety of those concerned so much depend. A moment’s negligence on his part may involve the loss of his vessel with all the property and the lives of all onboard”. The ARIADNE, 80 U.S. 478 (1872).

These words still ring true today. Yet collisions due to poor lookout still occur, despite an increasing array of electronic assistance in detecting and plotting other ships.

Example – Lookout Failure in the Crossing Situation

Recently, on a clear night in the Gulf of Mexico, a westbound ITB tanker completely failed to see a southbound Panamax bulker off her starboard bow until immediately before collision. The tanker’s captain (alone on watch, having sent his seaman below on an errand) was concentrating on another ship off his port side, and completely ignored his starboard bow, as well as his electronic chart, radar, and AIS display.

What happened?

Give-way ship failed to see stand-on ship.

Why did it happen?

The captain, distracted by another approaching vessel and lacking a “second pair of eyes”, failed either to look starboard, or if he did, to notice what was there.

How to prevent?

Keep a separate lookout on watch, especially when the primary navigator has a “situation” absorbing his concentration; use minimum-CPA alarm on radar, and on AIS; but recognize that the human eye is still the “best lookout”; correlate visual and radar contacts in order to identify other vessels in own ship’s vicinity.

Example－Lookout Failure in Meeting Head-On

A head-and-head meeting situation several decades ago on a clear night in Chesapeake Bay involved a downbound laden coal collier and an upbound Coast Guard training ship misunderstanding each other’s intentions, with disastrous results.
Training ship’s fatigued officer-in-charge somehow mistook the oncoming range lights fine on his port bow for a stern light, did not realize a ship was bearing down on his port bow, and turned to port directly in front of her, resulting in sinking and death of 14 Coast Guard officer candidates. Collier’s pilot had assumed from the lights shown that it would be a normal redto-red meeting. The two vessels never communicated with each other. Sole fault found against training ship.
Note: This collision was in 1980; today’s navigators have AIS,enabling them to hail each other by name, which conveniencetends to promote earlier and more effective radio communication.

What happened?

Failure of lookout on training ship, failure to communicate from collier.

Why did it happen?

Navigator fatigue on training ship; failure to initiate radio contact by collier.

How to prevent?

Alert navigators with adequate rest, proper use of radar.

Failure to Communicate Equals Failure to Understand
The “Not-Quite Head-On Scenario”

Vessels sighting each other on reciprocal headings with each slightly off the other’s starboard bow can create every navigator’s “nightmare”, since navigators can misunderstand as to whether it is a head-on situation to be steered “red-to-red”, or instead a safe green-to-green passage situation requiring no change of courses.

In a collision off Texas with inbound and outbound vessels closing each other at a combined relative speed of 30 knots, Vessel A judged it to be a safe green-to-green meeting while Vessel B apparently had lingering doubts about this and turned sharply to starboard when the ships were close, resulting in collision. Neither vessel had attempted to communicate with the other. The Court agreed with Vessel A that there was no risk of collision (0.3 mile lateral CPA prior to Vessel B’s sharp turn) and found Vessel B solely at fault.

What happened?

Two vessels approaching each other on reciprocal courses failed to communicate; one vessel incorrectly judged it a close-quarters situation and, without signal or warning, turned to starboard in front of the other.

Why did it happen?

Failure by one vessel to correctly determine CPA, and failure of either vessel to communicate with the other before Vessel B turned sharply to starboard without warning, creating a close quarters situation.

How to Prevent?

Early radio contact. Those who fail to communicate do so at their own peril.

Overtaking - Rule 13

A Panamax bulk carrier during an Atlantic crossing, in ballast, was sailing west into the late-afternoon sun. Her bridge watch were not keeping a sharp lookout either visually or on radar. Had they done so, they should have detected a wooden sailing yacht fine on the port bow. This overtaking resulted in light contact between the sloop and bulker’s port side. Radio contact was then established and the master of the yacht, who decided to abandon, was taken aboard the ship.

What happened?

Bulk carrier and yacht, both on westerly courses, collided, while in an overtaking situation.

Why did it happen?

Improper lookout on the part of bulker and yacht. Wood yacht did not have an effective radar reflector and her captain (sailing solo) saw the bulker well astern of him, yet went below deck and may have fallen asleep. His first notice of collision was feeling a jolt and then seeing the ship. Bulker’s crew failed to see the yacht in the bright sun’s reflection on the water.

How to Prevent?

Lack of a proper ship’s lookout while sailing into the sun, plus the complete absence of lookout on the sailboat, caused this collision. Proper bridge management procedures should ensure that this situation does not happen.

Restricted Visibility

Navigators must understand that Rule 19, “Restricted-Visibility Rule”, supersedes the Crossing Rule, Overtaking Rule, and Meeting Rule, since the latter apply only when “in sight of one another”.

In other words, Rule 19 does not “care” who is “on starboard”, overtaking, or even not-under-command. What matters is to proceed at a safe speed and carefully determine if a closequarter situation is developing and if so, then either vessel “shall take avoiding action in ample time”.

Special Situations

Harbor entrances and river traffic have their own unique hazards, and the COLREGS cannot anticipate every situation, many of which do indeed involve “Special Circumstances” under Rule 2.

Pilot Boarding/Disembarkation Areas and Harbor Entrances

The sea buoy area, where ships typically embark and disembark pilots, pose special difficulties for mariners, since vessels converge, diverge, and change course before and after dropping their pilots. Often there are distracting background lights and multiple vessels. All of this can lead to unexpected closequarter situations and collisions. A vigilant lookout and early communication are essential. Again, it is extremely important to correlate visual and radar contacts and ascertain the intentions of other vessels.

River Traffic – Congestion in Confined Waters

“Traffic jams” in a river must be avoided early on. Meeting in a bend of the river is generally inadvisable. Downbound vessels needing plenty of “sea room” in a bend, should consider “directing traffic” by requesting upbound vessels to hold up below the point/bend. In river current, it is easier for upbound vessels to slow under control, and much more difficult for downbound vessels to do so.

The Basics

Here are some basic “collision avoidance” thoughts, which every ship’s officer should already know:

1. Head-on situation – avoid getting into a “fine” on the bow (within 11 degrees end on or nearly so) aspect with another vessel by taking early action to avoid her, e.g. substantial course change, to widen the CPA, open masthead and range lights (if at night), and to show the other ship they are opening;
2. The Crossing Rule (Rule 15) sometimes called the “starboardhand rule” – if the other ship is showing you her red sidelight, alter course and keep out of her way. Do not try to pass her at close quarters, and take early avoiding action;
3. Steady bearing and decreasing range means that a significant chance of collision exists unless corrective action is taken. Look for bearing drift to “widen out” the other ship;
4. Do not wait until the last minute to alter course and speed; call the master to the bridge if in doubt; communicate early with other vessels.

Conclusion

Today, electronic navigation aids, including radar, ECDIS, AIS, ARPA and Voyage Data Recorder (“VDR”) have increased a vessel’s capabilities to avoid collisions under the International Safety management (“ISM”) and company protocols.

Yet, in spite of having the latest navigation aids, a ship remains at risk unless her bridge watch uses them effectively because they can be a distraction as well as a benefit.

Most collisions are avoidable. Most are caused by human error. Almost all collisions can be prevented by proper training and vigilance.